|
FIVE PHILOSPHERS’ THEORIES ON FREE WILL WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES Robert Waxman Abstract Over the last twenty-five hundred years, philosophers, psychologists, scholars, and theologians have been debating
the meaning of free will. This paper discusses various theories on this topic and offers comparative views by certain philosophers
mentioned in The Norton History of the Human Sciences (Smith, 1997). Included is a definition of free will, which
supports the claim that it is an innate characteristic possessed by human beings. In contrast, the theory of causal determinism
is set in juxtaposition to the notion that free will does not exist. There is a discussion of theories by Plato, Hobbes, Hume,
Leibniz, and Hegel. Included are philosophical theories with theological tenets, which lend some support to the concept of
free will. Other philosophical theories are devoid of theology and mostly support causal determinism. Causation is a form
of conditioned responses that negates the concept of free will. During the Age of Enlightenment, moral behavior, and the individual’s
ethical responsibilities were central to the case against free will. Hegel’s theory on "the freeing of the Will"
connects the evolution of the universe with the human quest for self-realization. The case "for and against free will"
may produce more insightful scholarship, if the debate remains within the realm of one academic discipline. Introduction In essays by world-renowned philosophers such as Aristotle, Philo, Aquinas, Spinoza, Descartes,
Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and Kant, there is little support for the claim that human beings possess free will. However, in the
writings of Epicurus, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Schopenhauer, and James, there are compelling arguments that lend
support (or limited support) to the notion that the Will is free. To summarize the nature of the debate, Hutcheon (1972) offers
a concise explanation from a humanist viewpoint: Is
there such a thing as free will? This is a burning question for many humanists who have come to feel that, although their
ethical life stance both implies and demands the existence of free will, the conclusions of science cast doubt on that very
possibility. The dilemma is not new. The "free will-determinism" issue has been key to philosophical discourse in
every age, if only because the justice systems of all civilized societies have always been based on the proposition that individuals
are responsible for their own behaviour. In the end, the position on free will taken by most people in every historical era
has come down to their beliefs about the nature of causality: beliefs implied by the world view prevalent at the time. Modern
notions about the nature of causality tend to come from one of three sources: (1) the philosophical dualism justifying most
of the world’s religious belief systems, which defines the human as different in kind from other aspects of nature --
and thus not subject to nature’s regularities as discovered by science; (2) the mechanistic determinism underlying the
world view apparently warranted by the theory and evidence from physics concerning the nature of reality; and (3) the "sovereign
ego", anti-science type of non-determinism propounded by the Existentialists. (pp. 172-173) To begin a discussion on the controversial topic of free will, there is a need to find
a credible working definition. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), "Free Will" is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational
agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Philosophers have debated this question for over two
millennia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it. Most philosophers suppose that the concept
of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just
to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions
on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives
to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance. But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection
to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments, as in why sustained
effort and creative work are praiseworthy; on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and
friendship. ("Free Will," 2011) Using this definition of
free will, the question arises as to whether human beings are making choices according to their moral beliefs. Consequently,
such beliefs are the "causes" that set individuals’ actions into motion, and thus, produce "effects"
in the real world. Accordingly, if moral responsibility provides the cause for an individual’s actions, then certain
preconditions exist for producing specific outcomes. Therefore, if a moral precondition is the cause that leads to the deciding
or choosing of specific behaviors, then the freedom associated with the term "free will" is in jeopardy. Thus, the
perennial question of whether free will truly exists is a hotly debated topic in scholarly discourse. Plato Plato (429-327 BCE) is among the first Western philosophers to discuss the issue of free will. In Laws, Plato
offers two opposing ideas on whether the Will is free. First, he says that human beings freely form their belief systems,
however; such belief systems provide the conditions or causes that are necessary for asserting the Will: Since our king perceived that all our actions have soul in them and contain much virtue
and likewise much vice, and that the complex of the soul and body when once it has come to be, though not eternal, is, like
the gods recognized by law, imperishable – for there would be no procreation of living creatures with either of the
pair destroyed – and since he considered that ’tis ever the nature of such soul as is good to work blessing and
of such as is evil to work harm – since he saw all this, I say, he contrived where to post each several item so as to
provide most utterly, easily, and well for the triumph of virtue and rout of vice throughout the whole. Thus he has contrived
to this universal end the seat or regions which must receive either type of soul as it is formed in their inhabitants, but
the causes of the formation of either type he left free to our individual volitions. For as a man’s desires tend, and
as is the soul that conceives them, so and such, as a general rule, does every one of us come to be. (904a-c, 1999) By stating that the forming of a cause is a free decision of the Will, Plato is lending
credence to the notion that free will exists. Furthermore, he is stating that individuals change their decisions according
to the shifting nature of their belief systems. Plato’s theory explains the ability of the soul to change beliefs (or
transform ideas), which lead to different outcomes in the future. He uses the phrase "law of destiny" to describe
a different (or right) outcome, which infers a type of predestination (or fate). However, in this case, the word "destiny"
is connoting a natural, virtuous path for the individual, or a life that is lived in harmony with "The Good." In Laws, Plato supports the notion that moral choices (as causes) are necessary
for the soul to achieve a heavenly state in the afterlife. Therefore, this freely chosen morality provides the necessary causes
for the progression of the soul: Thus all things that have part
in soul change, for the cause of change lies within themselves, and as they change they move in accord with the ordinance
and law of destiny. If their changes of character are unimportant and few, they are transferred over the surface of the soil;
if they are more and in the direction of grave wickedness, they fall into the depths and the so-called underworld the region
known by the name of Hades and the like appellations, which fill the fancy of the quick and departed alike with dreams of
dismay. If a soul have drunk still deeper of vice or virtue, by reason of its own volition and the potent influence of past
converse with others, when near contact with divine goodness has made it especially godlike, so surely is it removed to a
special place of utter holiness, and translated to another and better world, or, in the contrary case, transported to live
in the opposite realm. (904c-d, 1999) Although Plato is referring
to the free use of volition for improving the quality of the afterlife experience, he is basing his definition of free will
on the degree of moral and ethical integrity that individuals achieve during their lifetimes. Thus, Plato offers limited support
for the notion of free will. He argues that free will exists when individuals are freely choosing to change their moral beliefs,
however; such beliefs are continuing to provide the direct causes for the exertion of Will (Magill, 1990). Therefore, according
to Plato’s theory, various conditions must be present when an individual is making life decisions. Accordingly, this
discussion leads to a further exploration of the effects of causation, in which the theory of determinism refutes the concept
of free will. Leibniz and Determinism To compare Plato’s view of free will with the philosophical theory of determinism,
it is prudent to begin with a working definition from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011): The roots of the notion of determinism surely lie in a very common philosophical idea:
the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained, or that everything that is, has a sufficient reason
for being and being as it is, and not otherwise. In other words, the roots of determinism lie in what Leibniz named the
Principle of Sufficient Reason. But since precise physical theories began to be formulated with apparently deterministic character,
the notion has become separable from these roots. Philosophers of science are frequently interested in the determinism or
indeterminism of various theories, without necessarily starting from a view about Leibniz' Principle. Since the first clear
articulations of the concept, there has been a tendency among philosophers to believe in the truth of some sort of determinist
doctrine. ("Causal Determinism," 2010) Wilhelm Gottfried
Leibniz (1646-1716) is among the first philosophers to assemble a cogent theory of determinism, and he posits that a reason
(or cause) must exist for anything and everything to be, or to occur (Magill, 1990). His theory on determinism is similar
to the scientific notion of cause and effect. However, it is interesting to note that Leibniz (like Plato) refers to the soul
as the storehouse of all knowledge. He claims that the soul is evolving over time, but whatever course the soul chooses in
the future is predetermined. Thus, Leibniz is not only espousing a determinist theory on human behavior, but he is also supporting
the notion that the spiritual aspect of an individual is predictable: So
the present is big with the future, the future could have been read in the past, and distant things are expressed in what
is nearby. What is folded into any individual soul will become perceptible only through time, as the soul develops; but if
we could unfold it all at once right now, we could see the beauty of the universe in the individual soul—any individual
soul. But as each of the soul’s distinct perceptions involves an infinity of confused perceptions that take in the entire
universe, the soul itself doesn’t know the things of which it has a perception except insofar the perception is distinct
and conspicuous; and the extent to which a soul has distinct perceptions is the extent to which it is perfect. Every soul
knows infinity—knows everything—but knows it in a confused way. It is like what happens when I walk along the
seashore: in hearing the roar of the sea, I hear—though without distinguishing them—the individual little noises
of the waves out of which that total noise is made up. Similarly, our big confused perceptions are the outcome of the infinity
of tiny impressions that the whole universe makes on us. It is the same for each monad. Only God has distinct knowledge of
everything, as he is the source of everything. It has been well said that it’s as though God were like a centre that
is everywhere, with a circumference nowhere, because to him everything is immediately present, at no distance from that Centre.
("Principles of," 2006) Interestingly, Leibnitz (like Plato)
believes that as the soul unfolds, it gains wisdom, compassion, and an appreciation of the beauty of the universe. Like Plato,
he offers a combination of philosophy and theology by speaking about the soul’s connection to the Godhead. However,
despite Leibniz’ belief in an unfolding soul and an omnipresent Godhead, he believes that free will does not exist.
Instead, he contends that reality is causal, and every event has a reason for occurring (Magill, 1990). Thus, because of his
theories relating to the soul and the Godhead, Leibniz does not receive recognition as the originator of determinism. Usually,
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) receives credit as the founding voice of causal determinism. Hobbes Hobbes dismisses
theological assumptions about God and the soul and reduces human experience to the world of matter and motion. From his article
"Liberty and Necessity," he posits the principles on which his philosophy of determinism rests: I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he
does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action is to
imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate
imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate
appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth. I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate
succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will and is immediately next before the doing of the
action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during
his deliberations, are called intentions and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will which also in this case
may be called the last will, though the intentions change often. I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do
upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntary action, and action proceeding
from election is the same thing; and that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not
made an end of deliberating. ("Thomas Hobbes," n.d.) Since
Hobbes was an atheist, it is reasonable to assume that he did not struggle with theological issues while explaining his views
on determinism. His assertion that individuals only do what is in their best interests forms a sharp contrast to the Christian
notion of "love thy neighbor" and The Golden Rule. Hobbes contends that human beings are self-centered, and their
actions are set in motion by impulses to satisfy their desires (Magill, 1990). Consequently, if individuals are behaving according
to the dictates of self-gratification, then Hobbes believes they have no free will. Thus, human beings are corporeal beings
in a material world where every event has a cause with a determined outcome. It is only when individuals understand that they
are constrained by conditions in the material world that they feel any sense of freedom. Along these lines, David Hume (1711-1776)
builds upon the Hobbes’ theory of determinism and further advances the notion that human beings do not have free will.
Hume Hume focuses on the predictability of human behavior and assumes that all actions are finding motivation
through the instincts and passions, but not through reason (Magill, 1990). He holds individuals morally responsible for their
actions and contends that they should be rewarded or punished based on their actions (Reese, 1996). By punishing individuals
for immoral actions, they find it more desirable to act in a moral manner. Hume believes that individuals possess reason,
but "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and
obey them" (Reese, 1990, p. 318). Hume sets himself in opposition
to most moral philosophers, ancient and modern, who talk of the combat of passion and reason, and who urge human beings to
regulate their actions by reason and to grant it dominion over their contrary passions. He claims to prove that "reason
alone can never be a motive to any action of the will," and that reason alone "can never oppose passion in the direction
of the will." His view is not, of course, that reason plays no role in the generation of action; he grants that reason
provides information, in particular about means to our ends, which makes a difference to the direction of the will. His thesis
is that reason alone cannot move us to action; the impulse to act itself must come from passion. The doctrine that reason
alone is merely the "slave of the passions," i.e., that reason pursues knowledge of abstract and causal relations
solely in order to achieve passions' goals and provides no impulse of its own, is defended in the Treatise of Human Nature.
("Hume’s Moral," 2010) In summary, Hume theorizes
that human beings are under the control of their passions and desires. These innate or acquired cravings provide the impetus
for various types of causation, which will produce determined outcomes. Accordingly, Hume believes that free will does not
exist because human passions become the reasons (and the causes) for every human action. However, many modern philosophers
view Hobbes and Hume as "compatibilists" (Magill, 1990, p. 295) because they do not deny that individuals are free
to do what they want while driven by forces of instinct and passion (Magill, 1990). Therefore, individuals are free to assert
their Will, but causal determinism will always lead to a predictable outcome. Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1870-1831) posits that the universe and everything in it is evolving (Magill, 1990).
Consequently, as the universe evolves, its latent potential is unfolding until it reaches full expression. Correspondingly,
human beings are evolving and are undergoing a process of self-realization over time. During this process, the universe and
human beings are in a state of becoming, in like manner to seedlings blossoming into flowers. Interestingly, Hegel accepts
the notion that the Godhead is the cause of reason within the cosmos, and thus, his philosophy overlaps with a theology-based
philosophy. However, despite Hegel’s reliance on the Godhead to argue in favor of free will, his theory appears congruent
with the science of evolution. According to Hegel (1898), Secular
life is the positive and definite embodiment of the Spiritual Kingdom—the Kingdom of the Will manifesting itself in
outward existence. Mere impulses are also forms in which the inner life realizes itself; but these are transient and disconnected;
they are the ever-changing applications of volition. But that which is just and moral belongs to the essential, independent,
intrinsically universal Will; and if we would know what Right really is, we must abstract from inclination, impulse and desire
as the particular; i.e., we must know what the Will is in itself. For benevolent, charitable, social impulses are nothing
more than impulses— to which others of a different class are opposed. What the Will is in itself can be known only when
these specific and contradictory forms of volition have been eliminated. Then Will appears as Will, in its abstract essence.
The Will is Free only when it does not will anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself (for as long as it does so, it is
dependent), but wills itself alone—wills the Will. This is absolute Will —the volition to be free. Will making
itself its own object is the basis of all Right and Obligation—consequently of all statutory determinations of Right,
categorical imperatives, and enjoined obligations. The Freedom of the Will per se, is the principle and substantial basis
of all Eight—is itself absolute, inherently eternal Right, and the Supreme Right in comparison with other specific Rights;
nay, it is even that by which Man becomes Man, and is therefore the fundamental principle of Spirit. (p. 461) Hegel explains that for the Will to be free, the individual must eliminate any causes
or conditions that are affecting the state of the Will. He speaks about cleansing, or purifying the Will from the many conditioned
ideas upon which the Will has become dependent. Accordingly, once the individual eliminates these cultural and societal conceptual
dependencies, the Will is free to evolve in consciousness. Hegel
views freedom of the Will as a form of human progress that is collectively a type of endgame for humankind. He contends that
individuals are free to understand the nature of the universe by achieving such a realization, and consequently, they will
come to know the truth about themselves. Therefore, Hegel believes that individuals have the potential to free the Will, which
will allow them to reach full realization as human beings (in tandem with the evolution of the universe).Conclusion There is a voluminous amount of scholarly material on the existence, or non-existence
of free will. I chose to discuss the theories of Plato, Leibniz, Hobbes, Hume, and Hegel because they are important contributors
to the field of the Human Sciences. I have attempted to remain objective throughout the discussion, however, I could have
chosen to include the writings of "strict determinists" (like Kant), who state that it is impossible to prove that
free will exits. After much thought and reflection, I made the decision
to start at the beginning of the philosophical-theological discourse on this topic with the writings of Plato, and subsequently,
to move forward in time as various arguments evolve. I found that a major shift in philosophy occurs as Hobbes begins writing
about free will, and then, Hume advances Hobbes’ theories. As a result, causal determinism begins to gain momentum among
philosophers during the Age of Enlightenment. Interestingly, neither
Plato, nor most of the Greek philosophers fully support the notion of free will. They contend that human destiny is under
the power of the Fates, gods, and other natural forces in the universe that are working in accordance with cosmic law. The
Sophists take exception to this view by claiming that human beings have some free choices in life, but they stop short of
supporting the notion that human beings are unconditionally free to choose how they wish to live. Accordingly, in much of
Greek Philosophy, there is a strong link between free will and moral behavior, acquiring knowledge, and reaping the rewards
of a heavenly afterlife. There are also many similarities between the Greek and Christian theologies, whereby individuals
set various causes in motion during their lifetimes, and the corresponding effects are waiting for them in the afterlife.
Therefore, causation is the force behind "the choosing" of either moving toward "the Good," or deciding
to move away from it. Leibniz provides the initial intellectual
spark for challenging the concept of free will. He believes that human beings know what they want, and they will endeavor
to attain what is important to them. Leibniz posits that the Will is a force that energizes the individual to do the attaining.
He makes it clear that free will does not exist, and human beings are simply choosing which desire to pursue at any given
time. Therefore, individuals are constantly "willing" whatever instinctual desires they crave at various points
in their lives. Hobbes and Hume take the issue of causation further
and lay the foundations for the theory of determinism, which remains popular among modern scholars in the philosophical community.
Although there is a case for compatibility between casual determinism and free will, one must accept the prerequisite that
all actions spring from conditions or causes. As such, the Will is free to choose beliefs, but actions occur because of the
beliefs chosen. In Hegel’s writings on free will, there are similarities
to Taoist teachings. In fact, Hegel (1827) lectured on this topic, and he spoke of self-realization among Taoists who "sought to bring to consciousness what the true might be" ("Hegel
On," 2010, p. 1). Hegel was well versed in Taoism, and the Tao-Te-Ching supports the concept of free will. Many other
Eastern traditions support an unconditional freedom of the Will including Buddhism, Zen, Hinduism, Vedanta, and Shinto. In summary, there is no method
for proving that free will exists or does not exist. On the philosophical side of the argument, there appears to be many more
scholars arguing against free will. However, once theology enters the debate, the metaphysical issues of the Godhead and the
soul dramatically alters the dynamics of the argument. At this point, personal faith (or theological beliefs) may play an
important role in the discussion, and sometimes, emotions (stemming from psychological conditioning) will run high because
an individual’s personal identity is at stake. Therefore, when investigating this topic from an academic standpoint,
it may be prudent to examine various theories on free will from one of three positions: the psychological, the philosophical,
or the theological perspective. References Causal Determinism. (2010). In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal Free Will. (2011). In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/freewill Hamilton, E., & Huntington, C. (1999). The collected dialogues of Plato.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. Hegel, G. W. F.
(1898). Hegel's philosophy of right. London, United Kingdom: Chiswick Press. Hegel on Daoism (Taoism). (2010). Retrieved from The Autodidact Project website: http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/hegel-tao1.html
Hutcheon, P. D. (1972). Value theory: Toward conceptual clarification.
The British Journal of Sociology, 23(2), 172-187. Retrieved from JSTOR database http://www.jstor.org/pss/589108 Hume’s Moral Philosophy. (2010). In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#pw Magill, F. N. (1990). Masterpieces of philosophy. New York, NY: Harper Collins. Principles of nature and grace based on reason. (2006). Retrieved from Early Modern
Texts website: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibprin.pdf Reese,
W. L. (1999). Dictionary of philosophy and religion: Eastern and western thought. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Smith, R. (1997). The Norton history of the human sciences.
New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Thomas Hobbes: Causation itself:
Determinism and their compatibility with freedom. (n.d.). Retrieved from The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy website:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousHobbes.htm
|
